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THE FLORIDA DEATH ACTSLEo M. ALPERT**
THE COMMON LAW

In an early Florida automobile case the view is stated that at common law, conformable with the maxim actio personalis moritur cum
persona, there was no right of action for injury resulting in death
caused by the wrongful act or negligence of another., The writers of
American Jurisprudence, though agreeing that this was, and is, the
2
general thought, take pains to observe:
"[Eminent judges have vigorously dissented from and even
repudiated the view that at common law no action would lie
for causing the death of a human being and have maintained
the existence of a right of action in certain cases, at least where
the act causing the death was not a capital crime."
Continuing, they state succinctly the various and varied reasons for
the common law rule:3
"The common law rule denying a civil right of action against
a tortfeasor who wrongfully causes the death of a human being,
was, apparently, originally based on the doctrine that by the
death the civil injury was merged in the felony. This theory
lends no support to the rule where there is no felony. Later
decisions, while arriving at the same result, base the rule
on the ground that it is inconsistent with the policy of the law
to permit the value of human life to become the subject of
judicial computation. Some authorities have been content
to base their compliance with the stated rule on the maxim
*This article is an adaptation of a chapter from the author's forthcoming book
FLORIDA AuTomomr Accmmrr LAW, to be published by The Michie Company in
the Fall of 1957. A table of headings for this article appears at p. 183.
**A.B. 1932, Johns Hopkins University; LL.B. 1935, Yale University; author of
numerous articles in law reviews and other publications; Member of Miami, Florida,
Bar, Maryland Bar, and Bar of Supreme Court of the United States.
'Nolan v. Moore, 81 Fla. 594, 88 So. 601 (1920).
216 Am. Jun., Death §44 (1938).
aid. §48.

[158]
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'actio personalis moritur cum persona,' although, as has been
pointed out, this maxim does not seem to deal with the remedy
for the wrong done to the dependents of the decedent by being
deprived of his assistance.
"The common law rule denying the right to recover for
loss of services caused by wrongful death has been based upon
the reason that the relationship, on which the right to sue for
the loss of services is founded, is terminated by the death, so
that the very act, which gives the right of action, destroys the
right of action. None of the various reasons assigned seems
entirely satisfactory, and the real, practical foundation of the
rule as now established is probably the ipse dixit of Lord Ellenborough in the early case of Baxter v. Bolton."
The inanity of these "reasons" is manifest. And that the "real,
practical foundation of the rule" is an ipse dixit of Lord Ellenborough
adds shame to horror: the shamefulness, as Justice Holmes once said,
of any ruling based on nothing more than "it was once so decided";
and the horror that the person who so decided was the only English
judge who can be ranked, in all senses of the word, as the Tory of all
time.
Thus, on ipse dixit, "the principle of the common law" became
established and with time too deeply embedded to be changed, except
by statute; the Florida Supreme Court in 1933 expressed its misgivings
about the common law rule, saying that it might have decided the
matter differently had it not been for the accretion of over a hundred
4
years.
The common law rule was changed in England in 1846 by Lord
Campbell's Act - the prolific and able Lord Campbell of
whom it was said sourly that his ponderous Lives of the
Lord Chancellors and Lives of the Chief Justices added new terrors
to death. 5 So one lord gave what another had taken away, for the
object of the Act was to permit an action for wrongful death to be
maintained for the benefit of the deceased's dependents in order that
they, in their respective standings as determined by a jury, might be
recompensed in some measure for the financial loss caused by the
death.
4Florida E.C. Ry. v. McRoberts, 111 Fla. 278, 149 So. 631 (1933).
sFor other interesting sidelights on Lord Campbell see Alpert, Judicial Censorship of Obscene Literature, 52 HARv. L. REv. 40, 50 (1938).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1957

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [1957], Art. 2
FLORIDA DEATH ACTS
The pertinent parts of Lord Campbell's Act provide:,
"Whereas no action at law is now maintainable against
a person who by his wrongful act, neglect or default may have
caused the Death of another person, and it is oftentime right
and expedient that the Wrongdoer in such case should be
answerable in damages for the injury so caused by him: Be it
therefore enacted by the Queen's most excellent Majesty, by
and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and
Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, That whensoever the
Death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect or
default, and the Act, Neglect or Default is such as would (if
death had not ensued) have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, then and
in every such case the person who would have been liable if
death had not ensued shall be liable to an action for damages
notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although
the death shall have been caused under such circumstances as
amount in law to Felony.
"II. And be it enacted, that every such Action shall be for
the benefit of the Wife, Husband, Parent and Child of the
person whose death shall have been so caused and shall be
brought by and in the name of the executor or administrator
of the person deceased; and in every such action the jury may
give such damages as they may think proportioned to the injury resulting from such death to the parties respectively for
whom and for whose benefit such Action shall be brought; and
the amount so recovered after deducting the costs not recovered
from the defendant shall be divided amongst the before-mentioned parties in such shares as the Jury by their Verdict shall
find and direct.
"III. Provided always, and be it enacted, that not more than
one Action shall lie for and in respect of the same subject matter
of Complaint, and that every such action shall be commenced
within twelve calendar months after the death of such deceased person.
"V. And be it enacted, that the following words and expressions are intended to have the meanings hereby assigned
69

& 10 Vicr. c. 93 (1846).
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to them respectively, so far as such meanings are not excluded
by the context or by the nature of the subject matter, that is to
say . . . the word person shall apply to bodies politic and

corporate; and the word parent shall include father and mother
and grandfather and grandmother and stepfather and stepmother; and the word child shall include son and daughter and
grandson and granddaughter and stepson and stepdaughter."
The example set by our brothers-in-law across the sea was followed
in the United States, but with many unfortunate results. Few of the
state acts followed Lord Campbell's Act strictly in language; many
used their own conceptions of what the act was about; and most were
confused as to the kind of cause of action created. All were agreed,
however, that they had adopted Lord Campbell's Act or a reasonable
facsimile thereof. The result has been confusion compounded across
the several states of the United States, 7 and Florida has not been left
untouched.
THE FLORIDA STATUTES

Florida has three acts, the first of which is Rabelaisian in the
grandeur of its obfuscation. What is supposed to be the counterpart
of Lord Campbell's Act, usually called the Florida Wrongful Death
Act, and hereinafter referred to as the Death Act, was originally enacted in 1883 and has been amended a number of times, although
never in salient particulars. Omitting the portion concerning the
statutes of limitations," the pertinent parts of Florida Statutes 1955
read:
"768.01 Right of action for death. (1) Whenever the death of any person in this state shall
be caused by the wrongful act, negligence, carelessness or default of any individual or individuals, or by the wrongful act,
negligence, carelessness, or default of any corporation, or by
the wrongful act, negligence, carelessness, or default, of any
7

See the discussion in 25 C.J.S., Death §15 (1941).
sOn the theory that the Acts create a new and independent cause of action, it
was held in an action for wrongful death against a city that the requirement that
suit shall be filed within 12 months from the date of injury was overridden by
the Death Acts' limitation of two years. Parker v. Jacksonville, 82 So.2d 131 (Fla.
1955).
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agent of any corporation, acting in his capacity of agent of such
corporation (or by the wrongful act, negligence, carelessness or
default of any ship, vessel or boat or persons employed thereon)
and the act, negligence, carelessness or default, is such as would,
if the death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured
thereby to maintain an action (or to proceed in rem against
the said ship, vessel or boat, or in personam against the owners
thereof, or those having control of her) and to recover damages
in respect thereof, then and in every such case the person or
persons who, or the corporation (or the ship, vessel or boat),
which would have been liable in damages if death had not ensued shall be liable to an action for damages (or if a ship, vessel
or boat, to a libel in rem, and her owners or those responsible for
her wrongful act, negligence, carelessness or default, to a libel
in personam), notwithstanding the death of the person injured,
and although the death shall have been caused under such circumstances as amount in law to a felony.
"(2) The right of action as set forth in subsection (1) above
shall extend to and include actions ex contractu and ex delicto.
"768.02 Parties; damages; proviso. - Every such action shall
be brought by and in the name of the widow or husband, as
the case may be, and where there is neither widow nor husband
surviving the deceased, then the minor child or children may
maintain an action; and where there is neither widow nor
husband, nor minor child or children, then the action may be
maintained by any person or persons dependent on such person
killed for a support; and where there is neither of the above
classes of persons to sue, then the action may be maintained
by the executor or administrator, as the case may be, of the
person killed. In case of the death of any person solely entitled,
or of all the persons jointly entitled to sue, before action brought
or before the recovery of a final judgment in action brought by
him or them, the right of action or the action as the case may be,
shall survive to the person or persons next entitled to sue under
this section, and in case of the death of one or more persons
jointly entitled to sue before action brought or before the recovery of a final judgment in an action brought by them, the
right of action or the action, as the case may be, shall survive
to the survivor of such persons so jointly entitled to sue; and
in every such action the jury shall give such damages as the
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party or parties entitled to sue may have sustained by reason of
the death of the party killed; provided, that any person or
persons to whom a right of action may survive under the provisions of this act shall recover such damages as by law such
person or persons are entitled in their own right to recover,
irrespective of the damages recoverable by the person or persons
whom he or they may succeed."
The second act, hereinafter referred to as the Death of Minors Act,
deals specifically with the wrongful death of a minor:
"768.03 Parties in actions for death of child; damages. Whenever the death of any minor child shall be caused by the
wrongful act, negligence, carelessness or default of any individual, or by the wrongful act, negligence, carelessness or default of any private association or persons, or by the wrongful
act, negligence, carelessness or default of any officer, agent or
employee of any private association of persons, acting in his
capacity as such officer, agent or employee, or by the wrongful
act, negligence, carelessness or default of any corporation, or
by the wrongful act, negligence, carelessness or default of any
officer or agent, or employee of any corporation acting in his
capacity as such officer, agent or employee, the father of such
minor child, or if the father be not living, the mother may maintain an action against such individual, private association of
persons, or corporation, and may recover, not only for the loss
of services of such minor child, but in addition thereto, such sum
for the mental pain and suffering of the parent (or both parents)
if they survive, as the jury may assess."
The third act, hereinafter referred to as the Survival Act, was
originally enacted in 1828 and amended in 1951 to read:
"45.11 Actions; surviving death of a party. - No action for
personal injuries and no other action shall die with the person,
and all actions shall survive and may be instituted, maintained,
prosecuted and defended in the name of the personal representative of the deceased, or in the name of such other person
as may be provided by law."
These statutes caused the Florida Supreme Court to throw up
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its collective hands and cry for mercy. Said Justice Roberts in 1955,
speaking for a unanimous Court in Ellis v. Brown:9
"Our conclusion, after consideration of all the above-mentioned matters, is that there can be no recovery under the Survival Statute of damages for impairment of earning capacity
beyond the death of the injured person. We are cognizant of
the anomaly that results from this ruling, in that the wrongdoer will be required to respond in a less amount of damages
if the injured person dies, than if the injured persons [sic]
survives the injury. We must conclude, however, that the problem is essentially a legislative one - and one which, as a matter
of fact, arises out of the peculiar provisions of our Wrongful
Death Act, rather than the Survival Statute. Thus, contrary
to the provisions of Lord Campbell's Act, the prototype of our
Wrongful Death Act, under our Act the exclusive right of action
inures to the persons named therein, in the order named, and
limits the damages recoverable to such 'as the party . ..entitled to sue may have sustained by reason of the death of the
party killed,' Section 768.02 Fla. Stat., F.S.A.; whereas, under
Lord Campbell's Act, and those of many other states, the right
of action is given to the administrator of the deceased person,
who sues for the benefit of all the beneficiaries of the estate of
the deceased person .... As further evidence of the peculiarity
of our Wrongful Death Act, it might be noted that where the
deceased person left neither spouse nor child or other person
dependent upon him for support, so that the cause of action
devolves upon the administrator of his estate, such administrator can recover the full value of the loss of prospective estate of
the decedent, reduced to present worth .... So, again, it might
be said that it is cheaper to kill a person who leaves a spouse
or child or other person dependent upon him for support, than
it is to kill a person who is survived by no one in the designated
classes.
"But, as noted, the inequalities of the Act should be resolved by legislation and not by judicial pronouncement."
There are inequities in the Death Act in addition to those mentioned by Justice Roberts.
877

So.2d 845, 849 (Fla. 1955).
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First, the Act gives the first right of action to the surviving spouse,
regardless of the existence of children. Frequently there are children
of the deceased by a previous marriage who are not legal dependents
of the surviving spouse. Those children are cut out. If Lord Campbell's Act be read at this point it will be seen that it covers such an
eventuality, for the dependents of the deceased recover in their
respective statuses and the jury makes the allocation of the award.
Second, in placing the first right of action in the hands of the
surviving spouse, the act subjects the children to the mercy of a
careless spouse in at least two respects: the surviving spouse may
disappear or not care to sue; and the surviving spouse who does
sue and collect may deem the award his or her own to do with as he
or she may see fit, regardless of the children. Again, Lord Campbell's
Act covers these points.
Third, in giving the next right of action to the children of the
deceased the Act excludes other dependents. The hazards and partialities of that exclusion are obvious.
Fourth, the Act provides that when there are no dependents the
action may be maintained by the executor or administrator of the
person killed. This provision is peculiar because the purpose of the
Act is to compensate dependents of the deceased for their loss. Therefore, the right given to the executor or administrator does not jibe
with the purpose. If there are no dependents, how can there be a
person entitled to sue?
Fifth, the Act does not specify the kinds of damage that are recoverable for the wrongful death of adults, simply saying "damages,"
thus raising a number of vexing questions, difficult to answer because of the absence of legislative expression on what is essentially
a matter for legislative policy. The Death of Minors Act, be it noted,
does specify the kinds of damages compensable.
In at least one respect, however, the Florida Wrongful Death Act
is superior to the original Lord Campbell's Act. The latter limits recovery to the surviving spouse, parents, stepparents, grandparents,
children, stepchildren, and grandchildren. But there may be persons
dependent upon the deceased who do not fall within those classes. The
Florida Act encompasses any person dependent on the deceased, thus
providing for a determination of dependency in fact rather than a
class limited by law.
It is plain that some of the inequities and flaws in the Death Act
can be corrected only by legislation. Nonetheless it is a very real
question whether the matters mentioned by Justice Roberts have been
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brought upon the Supreme Court by itself. It therefore becomes apposite to consider the decisions of the Supreme Court under the death
and survival acts for that reason as well as for the reason that the acts
will surely be changed ° and the existing law is a standard against
which the changes can best be measured. The decisions hereinafter
considered, however, are limited to those in the automobile accident
field, except when a decision outside that field is necessary for an
understanding of the case law. There are well over a hundred cases
dealing with the death and survival acts, and the following discussion is not intended to be all-inclusive but merely reasonably comprehensive.
WRONGFUL DF-ATH OF ADULT

a. Suit Under the Death Act
Surviving Wife
In an early case, not involving an automobile, the Supreme Court
laid down the standard for damages recoverable by a wife for the
wrongful death of her husband:"1
"[T]he jury may properly take into consideration her loss of
the comfort, protection and society of the husband in the light
of all the evidence in the case relating to the character, habits
and conduct of the husband as husband, and to the marital
relations between the parties at the time of and prior to his
death; and they may also consider his services in assisting her in
the care of the family, if any, but the widow is not entitled to
recover for her mental anxiety or distress over the death of her
husband, nor for his mental or physical suffering from the result of the injury. She is also entitled to recover reasonable compensation for the loss of support which her husband was legally
bound to give her, based upon his probable future earnings and
other acquisitions, and the station or condition in society which
he would probably have occupied according to his past history
in that respect, and his reasonable expectations in the future;
10
ln 1957 an attempt was made to alleviate some of the inequities by amending
§768.02, but the proposed bill was not approved by the Legislature. H.B. 946, Fla.
Leg., Reg. Sess., 1957.
"iFlorida Cent. 8- P.R.R. v. Foxworth, 41 Fla. 1, 76, 25 So. 338, 348 (1899).
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his earnings and acquisitions to be estimated upon the basis
of the deceased's age, health, business capacity, habits, experience, energy and his present and future prospects for business
success at the time of his death. All these elements to be based
upon the probable joint lives of herself and husband. She is
also entitled to compensation for loss of whatever she might
reasonably have expected to receive in the way of dower or
legacies from her husband's estate, in case her life expectancy
be greater than his. The sum total of all these elements to be
reduced to a money value, and its present worth to be given
as damages ....

Within these limits the jury exercise a reason-

able discretion as to the amount to be awarded, based upon
the facts in evidence and the knowledge and experience possessed by them in matters of common knowledge and information."
The standard thus enunciated has become the settled law of Florida.12
If the Death Act be read at this point it will become apparent that
it lays down no such elements of damage. The Act provides that the
tort-feasor, who would have been liable in "damages," shall remain
liable despite the death and that the jury shall award such "damages"
as the party entitled to sue may have sustained by reason of the death.
Thus the Supreme Court, in so far as widows are concerned, eliminated mental pain from the coverage of the Act and allowed loss of
consortium, family services, support, and probable prospective estate.
To say that not all states so hold,'1 3 and to say, further, that Lord
Campbell's Act has been steadfastly construed as allowing "pecuniary
losses only, ' '1 4 is not to criticize the Florida construction or the interpretative process invoked - for such was necessary - but only to
place the Florida law in its proper perspective. In Florida a wife is
allowed to recover for the loss of consortium if her husband is killed
but not if he is injured. 15 Again, this is not stated in criticism, for the
12Frazier v. Ewell Engr. & Contr. Co., 62 So.2d 51 (Fla. 1952); Stanford Fruit

Growers, Inc. v. Frazier, 158 Fla. 135, 27 So.2d 906 (1946); Thrift Cabs, Inc. v. Owens,
156 Fla. 17, 22 So.2d 259 (1945); Southern Util. Co. v. Davis, 83 Fla. 366, 92 So. 683
(1922).
13 See McCoRMIcK, DAMAGES §98 (1935); 5 SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES §1265 (4th ed.
1916).
14KEMP and KEMP, THE QUANTUM OF DAMAGES IN PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS 9-10

(1954).

5Ripley v. Ewell, 61 So.2d 420 (Fla. 1952).
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problem has more facets than it seems; it is brought out because the
Court in so ruling said that loss of consortium on death of the husband was allowed because the Legislature so provided in the Death
Act,-0 which of course it did not. The allowance was entirely a judicial
construction.
Surviving Husband
The surviving husband is entitled to recover for the loss of consortium of the wife, for her services in caring for the family, for the
financial contributions made by the wife to the household, and for
reasonable funeral expenses.1 7 He probably will not be allowed recovery for loss of the prospective estate of the wife, though there are
no cases on the point, because the theory of the allowance to the wife
is based on her right of dower and there is no curtesy in Florida. The
question must be considered open, however, because the wife's right
to recover is also stated to be based in part on what she might reasonably expect to receive in legacies from her husband; and the converse here sounds equitable, if it is applicable at all to either, as will
later be questioned?18 But note again that the Court has done all this
as a matter of judicial interpretation, for on this point the statute
speaks only of "damages."
Minor Child
The elements of a minor child's claim under the Act, when there
is no parent surviving, are thus stated by the Supreme Court: 19
"(1) The loss of support which the father is in duty bound
to give his child during its minority, based on the evidence
of his probable future earnings and other acquisitions, such
earnings and acquisitions to be estimated upon the basis of
father's earnings in the past, his age, health, business capacity,
habits, experience and energy, and his present and future
prospects for business success at the time of his death; and (2)
the loss of attention, care, comfort, companionship, protection,
education and moral training of the father which might reason16Id. at 423.

'1Lithgow v. Hamilton, 69 So.2d 776 (Fla. 1954); see also Potts v. Mulligan, 141
Fla. 685, 193 So. 767 (1940) (funeral expenses).
lsSee p. 173 infra.
loTriay

v. Seals, 92 Fla. 310, 317, 109 So. 427, 430 (1926).
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ably have been anticipated in the light of the evidence relating
to the character and conduct of the father as such. The sum
total of all these elements to be reduced to a money value and
its present worth to be given as damages. Within these limits
the jury exercises a reasonable discretion as to the amount to
be awarded, based upon the facts in evidence and the knowledge
and experience possessed by them in relation to matters of
common knowledge and information."
Again it is to be noted that the second element stated is a judicial
interpretation of the Florida act and that the item of loss of probable
prospective estate allowed to the surviving wife is disallowed to the
minor child, also as a matter of judicial interpretation.
Other Dependent Person
In so far as a dependent other than a child or spouse is concerned,
the item of loss of support needs no authority for inclusion as an element of damages. There would seem to be no reason to deny inclusion of loss of attention, care, and training if in fact they are established by the evidence to have been given by the deceased to the
dependent. There do not appear to be any Florida cases on the point.
b. Suit by Administrator Under Combined Death and
Survival Acts
The Death Act states that when there are none of the specified
classes of persons entitled to sue, no spouse, no minor child, no dependent, the action may be maintained by the administrator or executor of the person killed. This is a peculiar provision. There is no
corresponding provision in the Death of Minors Act or in Lord
Campbell's Act.
Under the theory of compensating the family or dependents of a
deceased for loss caused by wrongful death, the provision allowing
action by an administrator when there are no family and no dependents is out of place. If, in fact, no one is hurt by the loss, there
is no reason to allow a suit by an administrator.
Lord Campbell's Act and the Florida Wrongful Death Act are
both construed to create a new cause of action- not to keep alive
an existing one - in favor of the dependents of the deceased.2 That
2OThere is no doubt of this; all the cases say so. See Ake v. Birnbaum, 156 Fla.
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being so, if there is no dependent there should be no suit.
When section 768.02 was enacted in 1883 there was on the books
the forerunner of section 45.11, the Survival Act, passed in 1828.21
The existence of the two statutes should have been a red flag warning
the bench and bar that the administrator's suit provision under section 768.02 had to be thoughtfully scrutinized - especially because
it was so out of place in a statute aimed at providing for dependents.
Several possibilities were thus presented for judicial interpretation.
One was that the administrator's suit provision was intended to tie
section 768.02 into section 45.11 to make it plain that when there
were no dependents the cause of action would be the one under
section 45.11. A second possible interpretation was that the administrator's suit provision was intended to allow recovery for the
estate of the deceased.
In Florida East Coast Ry. v. Hayes,22 decided in 1914, the Supreme Court adopted the second possibility, saying that the Legislature intended the administrator to recover "the present worth of
the decedent's life to an estimated prospective estate that he probably would have earned and saved.., to be left at his death." 23 The
24
elements of this recovery were set forth in a later case in this fashion:
"The jury ... may consider evidence as to the age, probable
duration of life, habits of industry, means, business, earnings,
health and skill of the deceased, and his reasonable future expectations. If the evidence shows the deceased's health, habits
or other conditions of life to be such that he had no reasonable
future expectations of an estate, the recovery would of course be
merely nominal.
"[T]he amount of recovery is not the value of the decedent's
life to any one or the public, but the recovery is limited to the
present value of an estate which the proofs show the decedent
735, 25 So.2d 213 (1945), modified on rehearing, id. at 745, 25 So.2d at 218 (1946).
21The 1828 act, appearing as FLA. STAT. §45.11 (1949), reads: "All actions for
personal injuries shall die with the person, to-wit: Assault and battery, slander,
false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution; all other actions shall and may be
maintained in the name of the representatives of the deceased."
2267 Fla. 101, 64 So. 504, 7 A.L.R. 1310 (1914).
231d. at 105, 64 So. at 505.
24Marianna & B.R.R. v. May, 83 Fla. 524, 527-28, 91 So. 553, 554-55 (1922). Note
text discrepancies between Florida and Southern Reports.
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may reasonably have been expected to earn and save had he
lived, where the accumulation of an estate by the decedent may
reasonably have been expected, and the present value thereof
can be ascertained with reasonable certainty from trustworthy
evidence upon all matters affecting the probabilities as to life
expectancy, physical condition, earning capacity, and opportunities, habits of life and of accumulation and other pertinent
circumstances."
Thirty-two years after the Hayes case the Supreme Court reaffirmed it in Ake v. Birnbaum,25 with the addition that the administrator, under section 45.11, could also recover for the mental pain
and suffering of the deceased and of course for the expenses incurred
by reason of the injury. Since that time there has been chaos added
to confusion, and the late admission of defeat in the Ellis case.
It is unfortunate that Ake v. Birnbaum must be picked as the case
adding the chaos because the opinion is truly well reasoned and expressed up to the final conclusion. The suit, involving an ordinary
death by auto accident, was filed by the executrix of the estate of the
decedent, there being no surviving spouse, child, or dependent. The
declaration first alleged the items of damage recoverable by the administrator or executor under section 768.02, based on the previous
decisions of the Court. Then two additional counts were added based
on the "survival of the original action," that is, that the deceased had
a cause of action which survived under section 45.11. Finally, after
a series of amendments, the suit wound up as a survival of action case
alone, claiming damages for loss of services, loss of value in the
estate, hospital expenses, medical expenses, pain and suffering, and the
like.
Justice Sebring, speaking for a divided Court on rehearing, put
26
the question this way:

"Where a person sustains physical injuries occasioned by the
negligent act of another, and such injured person ultimately
dies from the injuries inflicted, without having in the meantime instituted suit against the tortfeasor, may the personal
representative of the deceased institute and maintain suit against
25156 Fla. 735, 25 So.2d 213 (1945), modified on rehearing, id. at 745, 25 So.2d

at 218 (1946).
261d. at 748, 25 So.2d at 220.
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the tortfeasor for damages to the decedent, or does the original
cause of action die with the injured person or become merged
in the action which our wrongful death statute authorizes to be
instituted by certain expressly enumerated classes of persons
for the recovery of damages for the wrongful death of the
person killed?"
The issue, said the Court, had never been squarely presented to it
before. The original opinion had been that the Death Act afforded
the only remedy, and that the Survival Act could not be applicable because there had been no suit pending at the time of death. Justice Sebring pointed out in incisive fashion, however, the fact that two rights
were violated when an injury resulted in death: the right of the deceased to be secure in his person and the right of his family to support.
The Wrongful Death Statute, he continued, did not and was not intended to provide for the recovery of damages by the person physically
injured. On the contrary, the statute created a new cause of action
for the dependents of the deceased, unrelated to the injury to the deceased himself.
As to the Survival Act, Justice Sebring remarked that it could
not be said that the Act was intended only to keep alive a suit pending at the time of the death, because of the obviously absurd consequences that would follow.
Then came the conclusion: the cause of action of the deceased
survived to her personal representative, who could recover for physical
and mental pain and suffering of the deceased, expenses, and the like.
That conclusion is good but not good enough, because it did not
clarify the matter of the administrator suing under the Death Act
for the loss of estate of the deceased, based on the previous decisions.
The result was the distinction drawn by the Court in later cases that
the administrator could recover under section 45.11 for pain, suffering,
and similar damages; and under section 768.02 for loss of estate. The
climax of this line of interpretation was that a widow or child or dependent might recover less than a distant uncle who never saw the
deceased but who came in as heir under the administrator's recovery
for the estate.
But is that a fair or necessary interpretation of the statute?
The Legislature was faced with the problem of what to do on the
death of dependents. Suppose the wife dies before she recovers? or
the children? or the dependents? In the instance of the surviving
spouse the Legislature explicitly provided that the cause of action go
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to the next class and that such class recover in their own right irrespective of the damages recoverable by the class ahead. In the instance
of the death of the children, the same provision was made as to the
dependents. Suppose the dependents die? What then?
If no provision had been made in the Death Act for that contingency, the action would die. There would be no suit whatever,
and there would be nothing to survive under section 45.11. But if a
provision for an administrator's suit were inserted it would become
plain that the Legislature intended an administrator to recoverand that the administrator would not recover more than a dependent
might, or have greater or less rights under section 768.02 than under
section 45.11, but the administrator's rights as administrator. This
interpretation is strongly borne out by the explicit direction in the
statute that on death of one class the next class recovers "in their own
right," not in the right of those ahead of them.
The interpretation, therefore, that the Legislature did not intend an administrator under section 45.11 to be different from one
under section 768.02 is as equally tenable a construction as the one
adopted by the Court- and a sounder one because it would relieve
the frustration of purpose now complained of. To effect this change
from the present law would require nothing more than a change of
interpretation.
WRONGFUL DEATH oF MINOR

Suit by Parents Under Death of Minors Act
In Nolan v. Moore 7 a twelve-year-old boy had been killed by an
individual defendant's employee. The defendant set up two defenses
to the action under the Death of Minors Act, one of which came
perilously close to success. The first contention was that the act made
associations and corporations liable for the acts of their employees
but did not so provide as to individuals. Hence individuals could
be held liable only for their own acts, because the statute itself made
that distinction and the statute, being in derogation of the common law,
had to be strictly construed. Only on rehearing did the Florida Court
deny the defendant's contention. We may now smile at that "technicality," but there is some feeling among the bar today that a
2781 Fla. 594, 88 So. 601

(1920), modified on rehearing,81 Fla. 600, 88 So. 604

(1921).
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municipal corporation is not liable under the death acts because
"corporation" does not include a municipal corporation.
The defendant's second contention dealt with the "loss of services" clause in the statute. The Court ruled the loss of services
to be those to which the parent would have been entitled from the
time of death to the time the infant would have reached majority.
The sum of $5,000 had been recovered for loss of services and
$5,000 for the mental pain and suffering of the parents. A remittitur of $2,500 had been noted by the plaintiff's attorney. The Supreme Court felt that the evidence of earning capacity was meager,
for the boy had been a newspaper carrier earning from $2.75 to
$3.00 a week, and ordered the loss of services verdict reduced to
$1,000.
In Miami Dairy Farms, Inc. v. Tinsley the Court made this state28
ment on the standard of damages:
"The amount of the recovery should be reasonable recompense for parental mental pain and suffering and the
value at the date of the trial of fair compensation for services which in reasonable probability the child would have
rendered to the parents during the period from the wrongful death to the date when the child would have become
twenty-one years of age."
On second appeal it was held that the father could recover for the
mental pain and suffering of the mother, even though he alone
had instituted the action, and a verdict of $8,000 was allowed to
stand.29
Damages awarded under the Death of Minors Act are not punitive and must bear a reasonable relation to the facts, the status of
the parties, and the "philosophy and general trend of the decisions."3
A very recent case, however, allowed a verdict of $35,000 to the
father of a five-year-old boy, hurt in an automobile accident, who
lingered in a semi-comatose condition for some months before he
died, 31
In connection with the action by parents for the wrongful death
28115 Fla. 164, 165, 155 So. 852 (1934).
29121 Fla. 774, 164 So. 528 (1935).

3oFlorida Dairies Co. v. Rogers, 119 Fla. 451, 161 So. 85 (1935); see also Florida
E.C. Ry. v. McRoberts, 111 Fla. 278, 149 So. 631 (1933).
3Hooper Constr. Co. v. Drake, 73 So.2d 281 (Fla. 1954).
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of a minor, there would not appear to be any particular problems.
The statute is understandable, construable, and the standards of
compensation set by the statute are workable.
Suit by Administrator Under Death and Survival Acts
The Death of Minors Act does not contain a provision authorizing suit by an administrator. There is no reason for such a provision because the object of the statute is to give to the parents a
right to recover for loss of services and for their mental pain and
suffering. Suit by an administrator, therefore, must be founded
on another statute, assuming the common law actio personalis maxim to be correct.
Here arises a curious thing. Section 45.11 of Florida Statutes
1955 provides that an action for personal injuries does not die with
the person and may be maintained in the name of the personal
representative. It would therefore be assumed that the right of
the administrator to sue for what the child himself could have
sued for, had he lived, would be founded on section 45.11. But
the language of sections 768.01 and 768.02 covers the death of "any
person," whether a minor or not, and provides that, in the absence
of surviving spouse, children, or dependents, the administrator of
the deceased may sue. There are thus raised, as a matter for judicial construction, three possibilities for suit by an administrator.
He can proceed under section 45.11 or under section 768.02, or he
can file two suits- one under each section.
In Miami Dairy Farms, Inc. v. Tinsley, 32 a companion case to
the case of the same name discussed above, the Court stated that
the administrator was entitled to recover reasonable compensation
for the loss of the probable prospective estate of the deceased
minor and, on second appeal, ruled that an award of $1,000 was
not excessive23 Leaving aside for the moment the question of
what is meant by the probable prospective estate of the deceased,
what the Court specifically held was that the administrator's suit
was founded on section 768.02.
In Hooper Construction Co. v. Drake, however, the Supreme
Court said:

34

32115 Fla. 650, 155 So. 850 (1934).

33121 Fla. 780, 164 So. 530 (1935).
3473 So.2d 279, 281 (Fla. 1954).
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"It might also be noted, parenthetically, that the Administrator claimed damages for the loss of the prospective
earnings and savings of the deceased after he reached his
maturity, although such damages are recoverable only in
a suit by an Administrator under the Wrongful Death Act,
Sections 768.01 and 768.02 Florida Statutes, F.S.A. The Administrator's suit was apparently prosecuted under the Survival after Death Statute, Section 45.11, Florida Statutes,
F.S.A., in which the Administrator is entitled to recover for
the pain and suffering of the deceased, but not for the loss
of the decedent's prospective estate. Ake v. Birnbaum, 156
Fla. 735, 25 So.2d 213."
What the Supreme Court was there adopting was the third possibility mentioned above rather than the first. The Court was
saying that when a minor is killed the administrator has two actions:
one under section 45.11 to recover for the pain and suffering of the
deceased and one under section 768.02 to recover for loss of prospective earnings.
With all respect it is suggested that the decision is unsound and
unwarranted. It is this type of decision that has created the confusion and frustration finally complained of by the Court in Ellis
35

v. Brown.

In the first place, it was a minor who was involved in the
Drake case. The case of Ake v. Birnbaum cited by the Court as
authority for the distinction between the two causes of action did
not deal with a minor. In the second place, section 768.02 is concerned with compensating the dependents of a deceased, not with
the death of a minor. In the third place, section 768.03 is specifically directed toward the wrongful death of minors and hence
would seem logically to overrule any application to it of the general wrongful death statute. In the fourth place, as long as an administrator has sued, what basis can there be for denying him
damages in one capacity and allowing him damages in another
when all the while he has only one capacity-that of administrator. In the fifth place, it is going all around the barn to talk of
two suits when the Survival Act, in and of itself, supplies the answer.
The Drake case is the best proof of this; for in that case the suits
were pending when the boy died, and the father amended both suits.
35See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
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According to Drake, however, the father should have filed a third
suit by himself as administrator to recover for the loss of probable
prospective estate. The two-suit administrator theory of Drake
can also be examined in still another light -that thrown by the
fact that a deceased minor might have left a dependent.
Suit by Dependents Under Death of Minors Act
It may be difficult to conceive of a minor having dependents.
Dependency is generally thought to be the distinguishing characteristic of minority, and when a minor is no longer dependent he
is generally considered to be emancipated. On the other hand, it
does not necessarily follow that because a minor has a dependent
he is no longer a minor; the minor might, for example, have an
illegitimate child but still be a dependent. At any rate, assume
that situation to be possible in law in order to develop the analysis; and assume further that the minor is wrongfully killed. In
that situation there should be three causes of action and three
separate suits: one by the parents under the Death of Minors Act,
the next by the dependent illegitimate child under the Death Act,
and the last by the administrator of the minor's estate. The elements of damage in each suit are nonduplicating. In the action
by the parents their mental pain and suffering is a nonduplicating
item; their loss of services would depend upon what services the
deceased was actually rendering his parents or would render to
majority. In the action by the dependent child the actual fact of
dependency and amount of support would determine the loss, so
the recovery there would be nonduplicating. In the action by the
administrator, the pain and suffering of the deceased and loss of
estate 36 would be nonduplicating if the administrator were allowed to sue under section 45.11.
Under the Drake decision, however, the action by the administrator is not allowed under section 45.11 except to recover for pain
and suffering. To recover for loss of estate he must sue under section 768.02 and can do so only if there are none of the classes of
persons named prior to him in that statute. Thus in the case posed
for analysis the Drake and Tinsley decisions bar a right of action
3GThe phrase "loss of estate" or "loss of probable prospective estate" is used
by the cases and is here repeated only to stay on the same level. The question of

whether loss of estate is a proper element of damage is discussed on p. 173 infra.
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and a recovery that is essential to full compensation. And-what
is of startling moment -this is not a legislative but a judicial bar,
created solely by judicial interpretation of the statutes. That interpretation, as it should now be seen, could equally as well have
been otherwise.
SOME PARTIcuLAR ITEMs OF DAMAGE

Loss of Estate
The concept of loss of probable prospective estate has been
read into the Florida Wrongful Death Act by the Court,3 7 the Act
itself providing only for "damages." There is no doubt that Florida
has followed a large number of states in allowing loss of probable
prospective estate to a widow or an administrator.38 There is also
no doubt that textwriters use that phrase or its equivalent and talk
of the savings a deceased might have accumulated had it not been
for his untimely death. 39 It is therefore with the greatest diffidence
that the suggestion is made that the concept is erroneous, that it
accounts in part for the difficulty in making the Death Act workable, and that the idea of "loss of estate" may have resulted from an
40
unthinking inversion of the phrase "loss to estate."
Nowhere else in the law of damages is there any idea of increasing or decreasing compensation to an injured person because
he might or might not use the money wisely. A defendant cannot
minimize damages by urging that the plaintiff, if awarded $10,000,
would fritter it away in a week of riotous living. A plaintiff cannot increase damages by urging that had he been able to work
he would have saved his salary or wages, invested the money, and
made $10,000 on the $10,000. The plaintiff's qualities of wisdom,
industry, thrift, and financial acumen are weighed in assessing the
loss of his earning capacity when he has been permanently in3

TSee note 12 supra and accompanying text.
3SSee McCoimicK, DAMAGES §99 (1935); RESTATEMENT, TORTS §925 (1939); 5
SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES §1265 (4th ed. 1916).
aDEven RESATEMENT, TORTS §925, comment b (1939).
40"Loss of estate" may be equated with the additional amount which a wife
would have received if her husband had not been killed and she had survived him.
"Loss to estate" may be equated with the additional amount that would have
eventually fallen into the personal represdntative's hands if the husband had not
been killed.
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jured, together with his future expectations of bettering himself,
and he is awarded compensation accordingly.
The damages are not increased by an amount the plaintiff would
have saved because he is frugal; his frugality is taken into account,
or should be, when his damages are estimated by the jury in the
light of his habits, his attributes of character, and in the light of
the jury's experience as men of affairs themselves. Similarly the
plaintiff's laziness is taken into account. The compensation is the
once-and-for-all and in-full award based on impairment of earning
capacity, which does not mean what a plaintiff may be earning at
a particular time but does mean the capacity to earn over a lifetime. It is the capacity to earn that is compensated- nothing else.
Out-of-pocket expenses are obviously another matter.
Is there an operative difference between a plaintiff permanently
and totally disabled and a plaintiff "permanently" killed? Between a partial loss of earning capacity and a total loss of earning
capacity?
The object of the case and statutory law is to compensate for
the loss caused by death. Omitting for the moment the question
of who gets what and how; omitting the out-of-pocket losses and
debts incurred; and omitting the elements of damage not recognized in Florida cases- in order to remain with the Florida law
as it now is - there is the pain and suffering of the deceased; the
entire loss of his earning capacity; and the support, financial and
spiritual, given dependents or spouse or children as the case may
be. Whence comes the probable prospective estate and on what
ground?
Taking the Florida statutes as they now exist, it is a relatively
simple matter and one of judicial interpretation to hold that the
right of action vested in the administrator by the Survival Act and
by the Death Act are one and the same - a right to sue for the
pain and suffering of the deceased, the expenses incurred by reason
of the injury, and the loss of earning capacity, which is what the
deceased could have sued for had he lived. These would be, as they
in actuality are, the elements of damage compensable to the administrator. They would be the same whether the deceased was a minor
or an adult; they would be nonduplicating and would not cause
confusion; they would remain the same whether the deceased had instituted suit and then died before trial, or whether the suit had been
instituted only after death. A minor point is that of funeral expenses, which might well be cast into the administration expenses
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of the estate and so also recovered by the administrator.
As to the surviving spouse, he or she would recover for loss of
support and for loss of consortium. The loss of support is a factual
matter that has nothing to do with an estate. The proof of this
particular pudding is the eating that the wife or husband would
get, for there is a flaw in loss of support that no doubt impelled
the Florida Court and others to talk of "loss of estate." That flaw
is the obvious inadequacy of damages based on loss of support
when the deceased was a miser who stinted himself and his family
for mammon. In such an event "loss of estate" seems required for
fair compensation. But it is precisely because of this intermingling
of concepts that the difficulties have arisen; and, if loss of estate
be relied on, the same flaw appears- the inadequacy of damages
based on loss of estate when the deceased stinted at nothing for
his family.
The flaws at both ends would disappear, however, if loss of earning
capacity Were recovered and distributed in this wise: to the dependents,
the loss of the actual support received; to the estate, the balance. Thus
the dependents would recover what they lost by the death, and the
heirs of the deceased, including in many instances the dependents,
would also get their share of the estate. In this way the problems
might well be resolved and at the same time the peculiar "loss to
estate" notion, which has created difficulties of moment, would disappear.
For example, McCormick states that different courts adopt different tests for "loss to estate": (1) the present worth of probable
net earnings over the lifetime, that is, gross earnings less individual
living expenses; or (2) the present worth of savings over the lifetime; or (3) aggregate gross earnings. 41 He indicates that Florida
has adopted the second test.42 But actually savings have very little
effect on the computation of "the money value of a man," and the
view here advanced as a resolution of the problem can be stated to
be in accord with the economics of the situation as Messrs. Dublin
and Lotka calculate them in their pioneering work bearing that
title.43 The test of earning capacity, it is suggested, ought to be
treated just as it is in the ordinary injury case.
4lMcCoRMxcK, DAMAGES §96 (1935).

421d. at 342, n.34.
3

4 DUBLIN & LoTcA, THE MONEY VALUE OF A MAN

(rev. ed. 1946), particularly

Appendix D, Table 51.
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Punitive Damages
In Florida Dairies Co. v. Rogers4 4 dealing with the death of a
minor, and Florida East Coast Ry. v. McRoberts,45 dealing with the
death of an adult, punitive damages were held not allowable under
the Death Acts. The theory of these holdings was that the statutes
created a new cause of action and therefore the right was to recover only what the statutes specifically granted.
May punitive damages be recovered under the Survival Act?
Logically, if the deceased had filed suit claiming punitive damages
and then died, his personal representative should recover the punitive damages that the deceased could have recovered had he lived.
If that be so, should the punitive damage suit be barred because
the injured person did not live long enough to file it? Again the
answer would seem to be in the negative. Both answers are fortified by the new shape given the Survival Act in 1951. The fact that
the Survival Act makes no provision for punitive damages is irrelevant - the suit is not by dependents for support but by the
personal representative, who is, conceptually, the deceased.
Suppose the tort-feasor dies? Under our Survival Act that death
should make no difference, although the Restatement of Torts"6 suggests that the liability for punitive damages dies with the tortfeasor.
LEGAL DEFENSES
Estoppel by Judgment
If the deceased had prosecuted and lost an action
prior to his death, is a subsequent suit under the
Survival Act barred? Does loss of suit under one of
bar suit under the Survival Statute and vice versa?

for his injuries
Death Acts or
the Death Acts
The answer is

yes in both cases. In Collins v. Hall 47 an injured husband had sued

and lost the case. His widow later sued under the Death Act and a
4S
plea of estoppel by judgment was sustained. In a more recent case
the widow instituted the action under the Death Act and lost. She
44119 Fla. 451, 161 So. 85 (1935).
45111 Fla. 278, 149 So. 631 (1933).
46§926 (1939).
47117 Fla. 282, 157 So. 646, 99 A.L.R. 1086 (1934).
48Epps v. Railway Express Agency, 40 So.2d 131 (Fla. 1949).
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then had herself appointed administratrix of her husband's estate and
sued under the Survival Act. A plea of estoppel by judgment was
again sustained. The Court readily acknowledged that "the rights
of both the personal representative and the widow or other statutory beneficiary to recover damages against the alleged tort-feasor
were separate, distinct and independent rights" but went on to
state that these rights "nevertheless were necessarily dependent
upon the existence of an original right of recovery in the injured
person in the first instance."4 19 Justice Sebring, speaking for a unanimous Court, said that although the separate suits were for the
recovery of different items of damage, they were based on the same
alleged act of negligence, and once it was determined that there was
no negligence, any such further suits would be barred by the adverse judgment. The same ruling has been applied to a suit under
the Death of Minors Act. 50 Thus the principle, based on sound
reasoning, seems to be well established in Florida.
The Immunity Problem
If the deceased could not have sued for the tort, does suit lie
nonetheless under the Death Acts and the Survival Act? One aspect
of this question was considered and answered by the Court in the
fascinating case of Shiver v. Sessions,51 which was not, however, an
automobile case. The four minor children of Martha Sessions sued
the estate of their stepfather, who had shot and killed their mother,
his wife, and had then killed himself. The defendant contended
that the Death Act required the wrongful act to be such as would
have entitled the deceased to sue had she lived, which is correct
of course. From that, the defendant then argued that a husband
is immune from tort liability to his wife, which again is correct.
The syllogistic conclusion is that therefore the minor children had
no right to sue.
But, said Justice Roberts speaking for a unanimous Court, the
wife's disability to sue her husband for his tort is personal to her,
for the tortious act still remains a wrong, though the law exempts
the husband from liability to the wife. The Death Act creates a
new cause of action in the statutorily-named beneficiaries for re491d. at 133.
sORehe v. Airport U-Drive, Inc., 63 So.2d 66 (Fla. 1953).
5180 So.2d 905 (Fla. 1955).
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covery of the wrongful invasion of their rights as distinguished from
the rights of the deceased. Hence, the stepchildren could recover.
Two additional reasons were added: the immunity based on preserving marital harmony disappears when the spouse is killed; and
the Legislature could not be said to have intended that the wife's
disability to sue her husband should be a bar to suit by the wife's
surviving children.
This Florida view, says a commentator,5 2 is that of a recently
growing minority and is sound. The case, however, involves not
merely a weighing of one logic or one interpretation against another. There are other and deeper facets.
The crushing weight of authority is that a minor child has no
right to sue his parent in tort,53 and there does not appear to be
any Florida decision to the contrary. It is true that there is some
conflict over whether a minor child can sue, in tort, a stepparent
or one standing in loco parentis; and it is indicated that all such
cases that have allowed recovery have been based on a deliberate
or malicious wrong.5 4 In Shiver - a murder case - there was no discussion of this parental immunity. The case turned on the marital
immunity point alone. The immediate question therefore is whether the fact that the children were stepchildren of the tort-feasor
had any operative significance. A question of equal consequence is
whether the fact that the tort was a murder had any operative significance. From the opinion alone, neither of these two questions
can be answered.
Shiver, therefore, cannot be quoted as authority for holding that
the children of a deceased parent killed by the negligence of the
other parent can recover under the Death Act. Shiver is authority
only for the proposition that the marital immunity alone will not
bar a suit under the Death Act. Thus, should a case arise in which
the husband and wife, driving in the husband's car, are killed by
the negligence of the husband and the wife leaves no children but
only a dependent - say a distant cousin whom she supported - that
dependent could certainly recover under the Shiver doctrine. Should
that assumed case involve children of the husband and wife suing
to recover, the conclusion is questionable.
529 U. FLA. L. REv. 110 (1956).
5339 Am,. JUR., Parent and Child §90 (1942); 67 C.J.S., Parent and Child §61 (b) (2)

(1950).
5439 Am. JUR., Parent and Child §90 (1942).
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Now change the assumed case by having the wife leave no children and no dependents, with the suit brought by the wife's administrator. Can the administrator recover? It happens that to
Shiver there was a companion case, Sullivan v. Sessions,55 in which
the same wife's administratrix brought suit against the husband's
administrator under the Survival Act. That suit failed, because,
said Justice Roberts again speaking for a unanimous Court: 56
"There [in Shiver v. Sessions], we were concerned with a
suit based on a right of action entirely distinct from that
which the wife could have maintained during her lifetime,
except for her disability to suit [sic] her husband; here, we are
concerned with precisely the same right of action, brought
'in the name of the personal representative of the deceased,'
Section 45.11, to recover 'the damages which deceased could
have recovered had he lived and maintained the action.'
Ake v. Birnbaum, 156 Fla. 735, 25 So.2d 213, 220. See also
Ellis v. Brown, Fla. 1955, 77 So.2d 845. The wife during her
lifetime would have no right of action against her husband
on account of his tortious act, under the common-law rule
referred to above; her personal representative simply 'stands
in her shoes' and can have no greater rights than she should
have had during her lifetime. The action cannot, therefore, be maintained."
Does that ruling also apply to a similar suit by an administrator under section 768.02? The Florida cases have drawn a distinction between an administrator under section 45.11 and under
section 768.02. If that distinction be followed, it would seem that
an administrator under section 768.02 can recover. Now Shiver v.
Sessions is placed in proper perspective for examination. That
marital immunity alone should not bar an action under the Death
Act is the view now adopted in Florida. One cannot quarrel with
that view, for it is an expression of policy reached through judicial interpretation by those whose responsibility it is to enunciate
such views by that process; and counter policy reasons are not of
appreciably greater force. On the matter of parental immunity,
however, other policy considerations arise that cannot and should
not be taken as foreclosed by Shiver.
5580 So.2d 706 (Fla. 1955).
SOIbid.
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The 1957 Legislature saw introduced but killed in committee
(it is said that plaintiffs' lawyers objected) House Bill 946 by
Messrs. Sweeny and Karl of Volusia County, a workmanlike effort to
correct the appalling Florida situation. The bill would not have
changed the Death of Minors Act nor the Survival Act, nor even
the confusing but understandable section 768.01. Section 768.02
would have been completely rewritten; and it is fruitful to set out
the pertinent provisions of the bill, together with comment.
The Bill

Comment

Section 768.02 (1). "Every such
action shall be brought by and
in the name of the personal representative for the use and benefit of the following: (a) the surviving spouse and children of the
person killed and the estate of the
person killed; or, (b) if there be
neither surviving spouse nor children, then the surviving parent
or parents, if any, and such persons as may be dependent for
support on such person killed,
and the estate of the person
killed."

This is certainly a step in the
right direction. Instead of fixed
priorities, however, would it not
be better to allow the actual factual loss to be ascertained by
this type of statute: Every such
action shall be brought by and
in the name of the personal representative for the use and benefit of the following, there being
no priority intended in the
enumeration: surviving spouse,
child or children, parent or
parents, such persons as may be
dependent for support on the
person killed, and the estate of
the person killed.

Section 768.02 (2). "The jury,
or the court, if there by no jury,
shall award such damages to each
of the persons for whose use and
benefit the action is prosecuted
as such person may have sustained by reason of the death of
the person killed and shall award
such damages to the personal

This paragraph is excellent.
The only change that might be
suggested is that the word "person" where it last appears be followed by the phrase "or the estate." This paragraph together
with the preceding paragraph
now establish a loss to be determined factually: What did
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representative for the use and
benefit of the estate, as the estate
may have sustained by reason of
such death. In every such case
the jury or the court, if there be
no jury, shall specify the amount
apportioned to each person for
whose use and benefit the action
is prosecuted."

each dependent person and the
estate actually lose by the death?

Section 768.02 (3). This paraThe only suggestion here is
graph provides for approval by that both the probate court and
the court of a compromise set- the court in which the action
tlement, and for the court to ap- may be pending approve the
portion the proceeds of such an compromise.
approved compromise settlement.
Section 768.02 (4), This paragraph provides that the amount
recovered for the use and benefit
of others than the estate not be
assets in the hands of the estate.
The paragraph further provides
that priorities be had if the
amount collected is insufficient
to pay the awards in full.

It is suggested that there be
no priorities in law; that there
be a pro rata distribution on
insufficiency.

Section 768.02 (5). "Nothing
herein contained shall be taken
to impair the rights of any parent
to maintain an action for the
death of his or her minor child
under the provisions of section
768.03, Florida Statutes, 1955,
which rights are expressly preserved, provided, however, that
no recovery may be had under
the provisions hereof for the use
and benefit of any parent who
shall have recovered or on whose
behalf a recovery has been had

This again is an excellent
step; but it is suggested that the
paragraph make explicit the
losses arising from death of minors by this language: Nothing
herein contained shall be taken
to impair the rights of any parent to maintain an action for
the death of his or her minor
child under the provisions of
section 768.03, Florida Statutes,
1955, which rights are expressly
preserved. Only a dependent of
a minor, if such exists, can re-
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under the provisions of said section 768.03."

cover under this act, save as
mentioned in section 768.02 (6).

Section 768.02 (6). "Nor shall
anything herein contained be
taken to limit or impair any
right which the personal representative would otherwise have
to institute, maintain or prosecute an action for personal injuries which shall have been sustained by the person killed and
which shall survive under other
provisions of law. And such
other action as shall survive may
be joined with any action maintained under the provisions of
this section."

Again an excellent step. The
Survival Act is untouched. One
sentence might be added to make
the application clear, namely:
The object and purpose of this
act is to preserve and limit to
parents their rights under section 768.03, to preserve and limit
to dependents their rights under
section 768.02 as now amended,
and to preserve and limit to the
personal representative of the deceased, whether or not a minor,
those rights for which the deceased might have sued had he
or she survived.

It is to be noted, however, that the bill does not contain the
elements or any standards for the measure of the various damages.
From all that has been previously discussed in this rather lengthy
article, it is hoped that the problems of the elements of damage
have been made sufficiently plain to be handled legislatively.
The truly appalling situation in Florida arising out of our
Death Acts cannot be overemphasized. The grief, misery and travail, loss and destitution, are unnecessary. The Death Acts must be
changed. Our Supreme Court has itself asked that.
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